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Problems of Regulatory Reforms in Electricity: 
Examples from Turkey
is issue of the Network Industries Quarterly looks into the change 
in the Turkish electricity markets. e regulatory reform in the Turk-
ish electricity markets began in the 1990s. It has culminated with the 
privatization of distribution of retail companies in the early 2010s. e 
enactment of the Electricity Market Act in 2001 was a turning point 
toward a more competitive market environment. However, the evolu-
tion of the reform has not gone perfectly. e transformation of the 
electricity industry had conflicting consequences for the market struc-
ture. e tensions between economic and political preferences have 
become more prevalent. In this respect, the Turkish experience pro-
vides additional insights into issues surrounding the process of open-
ing markets to competition. While regulatory reform seems complete 
in terms of unbundling, tariff policies and the institutionalization of 
regulatory processes, competition policy issues begin to surface and 
political interference become more prevalent. 
In this issue, we look into different aspects of the recent Turkish ex-
perience. In the first article, Özbuğday and Alma discuss distribution/
retail unbundling in the Turkish electricity markets. e paper draws 
attention to the increasing issues of competition policy as a result of 
privatizations in the industry. e second article by Şenerdem and 
Akkemik brings forward a fundamental issue: the lack of data and the 
difficulty of constructing social accounting matrices. e authors in-
troduce a social accounting matrix (SAM) with a special emphasis on 
electricity for the year of 2010. ey put first steps forward of develop-
ing a general empirical perspective on the nature of electricity markets. 
e lack of reliable data has become a key issue in understanding the 
relative success of the reform efforts. Significantly, changes in efficiency 
are very hard to measure. ese difficulties create opportunities for 
political interventions. e third paper by Oğuz and Göksal addresses 
recent policy shifts in the Turkish electricity markets. Focusing on the 
existing distribution tariffs, the paper emphasizes the need to improve 
the regulatory framework. In the last paper, Benli and Benli look 
into a major hurdle in the implementation of the regulatory reform; 
namely, how to deal with illegal use and electricity theft from a legal 
perspective. By applying the Coase theorem, they argue that electricity 
theft should be seen as a social problem rather than a contracting issue. 
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The Effectiveness of Unbundling in Turkish Electricity Supply Market
Fatih Cemil Özbuğday* , Hasan Alma**
In this paper we construct a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Turkey with an emphasis on electricity sectors. For this purpose, we collect 
data from various sources and reorganize them into a balanced SAM. We specifically disaggregate the electricity sector into public generation 
and private generation sectors, and introduce four satellite accounts: public wholesale trading, private wholesale trading, distribution, and 
organized power market. 
1. Introduction
Traditional electricity markets are characterized by vari-
ous positive vertical synergies. Meyer (2012) counts two 
possible sources of these positive synergies: coordination 
economies and market risk economies. While the former 
refers to the fact that all rings of the supply chain in the 
electricity market must be coordinated because of real-time 
balancing requirement of the system, the latter relates to 
the dependencies of electricity enterprises on other market 
players’ operational and strategic decisions. us, given the 
positive vertical synergies and the complexity of vertical 
relations, imposing unbundling to boost competition in 
the electricity supply market is a very demanding task. As 
put by Mulder and Shestalova (2006), transformation of 
the vertically integrated electricity industry into markets 
governed by competition rules is quite complicated, and 
according to Joskow (2005) even the best experts have dis-
agreements about how to achieve this transformation.
e solution to transform vertically-integrated electricity 
markets in to competition-based markets is unbundling, in 
which retail services and distribution activities are vertical-
ly separated.  Unbundling (referred to as legal unbundling) 
started to take place in Europe with the European Com-
mission’s introduction of the Second Electricity Directive 
in 2003, and since then many European countries unbun-
dled their electricity markets to varying degrees. e ap-
proach to unbundling in the United States (US) has been 
quite different. Due to the cessation of deregulation of the 
power markets since the 2000-2001 energy crisis in Cali-
fornia, vertically integrated franchised suppliers remained 
as monopolies in their geographic areas. Besides the ab-
sence of deregulation, the fragmented regulatory structure 
of the US electricity supply industry and strong private 
ownership rights resulted in less emphasis on unbundling 
in the US in comparison to Europe (Meyer, 2012).
Distribution/retail unbundling is the most essential ele-
ment of retail competition in which consumers are free to 
choose their suppliers. However, experience to date sug-
gests that vertical separation of the electricity supply indus-
try is a necessary but not sufficient condition of compet-
itive electricity supply markets. Legal unbundling, which 
corresponds to the execution of supply and distribution 
activities under different legal entities and is the most ge-
neric form of unbundling observed, cannot fully eliminate 
the incentive of the distribution company to provide a fa-
vorable treatment to its affiliated supply companies. is 
risk of preferential treatment to affiliated companies is also 
recognized by the European Commission in its Sector In-
quiry on the energy markets. e Commission argues that 
even under legal unbundling, network operators and affil-
iated supply companies have both the incentive and the 
ability to obstruct entry and competition in the electricity 
supply market. us, in the words of Beard et al. (2001), 
an upstream firm with market power (a natural monopoly 
network operator that provides “access to the grid” for sup-
ply companies) can sabotage rivals (competing suppliers) 
at the downstream stage by degrading the quality of input 
and/or raising rivals’ costs. For instance, network opera-
tors can employ non-price discrimination such as delays 
in network connection or administrative obstacles to pre-
vent customers from switching. At the extreme, this form 
of “sabotage” could result in vertical foreclosure (Meyer, 
2012) and thereby a loss in consumer welfare.
2. The Experience of Turkey with Retail Competition 
and Unbundling
Turkey’s electricity market saw a dramatic restructuring 
during the last 15 years. ere has been a radical transition 
from a vertically integrated public monopoly model to a 
model of regulated competition with privatized and un-
bundled firms. Each of the distribution companies togeth-
er with the affiliated supplier of last resort is privatized, the 
distribution activities and retail sale (supply) operations 
are legally unbundled, and the supply market is gradually 
opened to competition. As of 2017, consumers with an 
* Assistant Professor of Economics, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Faculty of Political Sciences; fcozbugday@ybu.edu.tr
** Ph.D. in Finance, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority; halma@epdk.org.tr
1  For a comprehensive treatment of unbundling and its variations, see Pollitt (2008), Mulder and Shestalova (2006), Baarsma et al. (2007).
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annual consumption of at least 2,400 kWh of electricity 
(which corresponds to approximately 83 TRY or 23 US 
dollars per monthly bill) are free to choose their suppli-
ers. e number of eligible consumers as of March 2017 
is about 3.5 million, a substantial majority of which (2.2 
million) is residential consumers. e most recent available 
figures suggest that switching rates (based on consumption 
value) hover around 1.4% (EMRA, 2016). e last-resort 
suppliers have near-monopoly positions in their franchised 
regions. All these suggest that there are problems with the 
development of retail competition in Turkish electricity 
markets. Part of the problem can be attributed to many 
other factors such as cross-subsidized tariffs, regulated rates 
below market prices, low levels of customer awareness, and 
public involvement in the electricity market for political 
purposes. Yet, a major obstacle to the development of the 
electricity supply sector in Turkey is insufficient vertical 
unbundling of supply and distribution.2
As mentioned previously, the observation that network 
operators and affiliated supply companies have both in-
centive and the ability to hinder entry and competition 
in the electricity supply market is prevalent across many 
electricity markets. Non-price discrimination by network 
operators is common to obstruct customers’ switching 
activity. Is this incentive of network operators and affili-
ated supply companies to prevent entry and competition 
stronger in Turkey than in Europe? an in the US? in the 
wake of joint privatization of electricity distributors and 
supply businesses3.  e new owners spent billions of US 
dollars (12.75 billion in total) to own not only electricity 
distribution assets but also the customer base in the regions 
concerned. Combined with the legal unbundling of the 
retail and distribution businesses, the enhancement of re-
tail competition is likely to undermine the profitability of 
last-resort suppliers leaving them with significant losses in 
cash flow (Ozbugday et al., 2016). 
e incentives of network operators and affiliated supply 
companies to prevent entry and competition in the elec-
tricity supply market are apparent in the complaints filed 
before the Competition Authorsity. e themes in these 
early complaints indicate non-price discrimination against 
rival suppliers and preferential treatment over affiliated 
last-resort suppliers (regarding meter reading, billing, re-
pairs, advertising, sharing consumer information, etc.) by 
the network operators. e problems with the effectiveness 
of unbundling are also mentioned in the Sector Inquiry re-
port of the Competition Authority (Competition Authori-
ty, 2015). However, these early complaints were dismissed 
by the Competition Authority. It argued that the dynamic 
structure of the liberalization process and time frame make 
it difficult to distinguish whether the complaints should 
be attributed to abuses of dominant positions, and there-
fore to the ineffectiveness of unbundling, or to problems 
resulting from the implementation of sectoral regulations.
A new wave of investigations has been initiated by the 
Competition Authority since the second half of 2016. All 
these investigations refer to the violation of the Article 6 
of the Competition Act, as the firms concerned allegedly 
acted against the principles of legal unbundling. In two of 
the investigations, the investigation also covered the par-
ent company (Enerjisa and Bereket) that jointly owns the 
distribution company and the affiliated supplier company. 
Date Decision 
Number
Distribution Company Associated Supplier4 Market Share 
of the Supplier 
in 2015  (%)
Parent 
Company
19.07.2016 16-24/407-M Akdeniz Elektrik Dağıtım 
A.Ş.
CLK Akdeniz Elektrik Pera-
kende Satış A.Ş.
3.26 CLK
28.12.2016 16-45/715-M Toroslar Elektrik Dağıtım 
A.Ş.
Enerjisa Toroslar Elektrik Pera-
kende Satış A.Ş.
8.96 Enerjisa
28.12.2016 16-45/715-M Başkent Elektrik Dağıtım 
A.Ş.
Enerjisa Başkent Elektrik Pera-
kende Satış A.Ş.
6.38 Enerjisa
28.12.2016 16-45/715-M İstanbul Anadolu Yakası 
Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş.
Enerjisa İstanbul Anadolu 
Yakası Elektrik Perakende Satış 
A.Ş.
4.47 Enerjisa
16.02.2017 17-07/69-M ADM Elektrik Dağıtım 
A.Ş.
Aydem Elektrik Perakende 
Satış A.Ş.
3.84 Bereket
16.02.2017 17-07/69-M GDZ Elektrik Dağıtım 
A.Ş.
Gediz Elektrik Perakende Satış 
A.Ş.
6.34 Bereket
Table 1: e New Wave of Investigations Initiated by the Competition Authority
2 For the development of competition policies in Turkish electricity markets see also Çetinkaya et al. (2015) and Eroğlu (2015). 
3 e sequence of privatization and unbundling was different in another example. In the Netherlands, ownership unbund-
ling was seen as a precondition for the privatization of supply operations. For more details, see Künneke and Fens (2007). 
4 Market shares are calculated at the national level using 2015 consumption figures. More information can be found in EMRA (2016). is 
is the most recent report published by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority on the electricity market. 
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e supplier companies in the investigations collectively 
sell about one third of the electricity at the retail level in 
Turkey. More detailed information about the investiga-
tions is provided in Table 1. 
e final verdicts on these investigations will impinge 
upon the effectiveness of unbundling in the Turkish elec-
tricity supply market. If the Competition Authority acts 
leniently and finds that the allegations against the distri-
bution companies and associated last-resort suppliers are 
irrelevant (as it did before), the perception of insufficient 
unbundling is expected to carry on.
3. Recent Regulatory Stance on Unbundling
e investigations led by the Competition Authority are 
kept on according to its own legislation. Elsewhere, the 
Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), which is 
the regulatory body in the Turkish electricity market, is 
also taking the relevant regulatory measures and precau-
tions to overcome the problems related to the effectiveness 
of unbundling in the Turkish electricity supply market. For 
instance, in a recent decision5,  the Energy Market Regula-
tory Board (EMRB) banned distribution companies from 
using web sites, web or mobile applications, social media 
accounts, advertisements etc. to create the impression that 
distribution and supply activities were related. In the same 
decision, the Board also established that a distribution 
company, the associated last-resort supplier, the parent 
company that owns both, and an enterprise that provides 
support services and is owned by the parent company can-
not continue their operations in the same building. 
Despite its current involvement, in its past decisions, the 
EMRB has been lenient towards the actions by distribu-
tion companies, associated last-resort suppliers or parent 
companies that prevent the effectiveness of unbundling. 
e main reason behind this attitude was the aim of con-
trolling increases in costs.
eoretically, the ultimate and radical solution to all 
these problems about unbundling could be ownership un-
bundling. Yet, there is no such plan in the agenda. Instead, 
the current approach of the EMRA towards unbundling 
can be summarized using the motto of “leave it to con-
sumers”. e EMRA essentially considers that the issues 
around unbundling will resolve themselves as the public 
opinion learns more about unbundling and supply com-
petition. us, even though the EMRB takes relevant reg-
ulatory decisions, the main expectation is that consumers 
take the lead in this process. 
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An Electricity-Based Social Accounting Matrix for Turkey for 2010
Erisa Dautaj Şenerdem*  and K. Ali Akkemik**
In this paper we construct a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Turkey with an emphasis on electricity sectors. For this purpose, we collect 
data from various sources and reorganize them into a balanced SAM. We specifically disaggregate the electricity sector into public generation 
and private generation sectors, and introduce four satellite accounts: public wholesale trading, private wholesale trading, distribution, and 
organized power market. 
1.Introduction
Electric power is a vital source of energy for households 
and a key input for industries. e sector has traditional-
ly been recognized as strategic by governments and large 
sunk costs give the industry features of a natural monopo-
ly. is approach has mostly led to high inefficiencies and 
large burdens on state budgets. e trend has reversed in 
the beginning of the 1980s upon arguments that it was 
possible and economically viable to open up the power 
sector to competition at least for certain segments within 
the industry. 
Power market reforms were launched in a number of 
countries and Turkey has been no exception. Various at-
tempts in the past to unbundle the state-owned and ver-
tically integrated electricity facilities resulted in a complex 
system of ownership. Since the start of the reforms in 2001, 
the Turkish electric power sector has undergone a compre-
hensive reform process. Organized markets, including day-
ahead balancing and settlement, an intra-day market, and 
a power exchange, have been established recently in a bid 
to generate price signals for future investment. In this re-
gard, the power sector has been an important component 
of competition policy. 
In this paper, we introduce a Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) with an emphasis on electricity markets for 2010, 
which can be used to analyze the electricity market. SAM 
is “a comprehensive and disaggregated snapshot of the 
socio-economic system during a given year” (orbecke, 
2000). We collect data from various institutions and re-
organize them into a SAM which can be used for analysis 
of the power market and the power market reforms. In 
constructing the SAM, we make much use of Erten (2009) 
and Telli (2006) in some stages. We chose 2010 because 
data were available at a desired sectoral level for energy sec-
tors.
2. The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
2.1. Structure of the SAM 
SAM is a square matrix in the form of an extended In-
put-Output Table (IOT), mapping intersectoral transac-
tions and interrelations among institutions (households, 
firms, government, capital, rest of the world) in an econ-
omy. It has been used for policy analysis (Sadoulet and de 
Janvry, 1995). Columns in a SAM represent payments and 
rows represent receipts. For the respective accounts, the 
sum of total spending equals total income. e aggregated 
matrix is presented in Table 1. “Activities” account refers 
to production entities that produce goods and services and 
“Commodities” account refers to the goods and services 
produced. ere are three factors of production: labor, 
privately owned capital, and public capital. Institutions 
include households, enterprises, government, private sav-
ings, public savings, and the rest of the world. 
Input-Output Tables: e core part of the micro-SAM 
is the IOT which reports transactions among production 
activities. We used the I-O coefficients in 2002 IOT and 
updated the monetary values of all intersectoral transac-
tions to 2010. We reorganize and aggregate the sectoral 
classification of the IOT into 16 sectors before disaggregat-
ing the power sector. e number of sectors increases to 21 
with the introduction of detailed power sectors. e IOT 
in Turkey are reported in basic prices, i.e., payments to 
producers net of taxes, trade and transport margins, inclu-
sive of subsidies. In the SAM, the final demand columns 
are expressed in producers’ prices. 
Output, Value-added, and Intermediate Demand: Sec-
toral distribution of value added is available in GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) series. Disaggregated data at the 
sectoral level for exports and imports were obtained from 
Turkstat. However, data on final demand, i.e., private and 
public consumption and capital formation at NACE Rev. 
3 disaggregation are not available and they are estimated. 
To estimate intermediate demand (inputs) data, we follow 
*   Argus Media Ltd. London UK. Email: erisa.dautaj@gmail.com
**  Kadir Has University Department of Economics Istanbul Turkey. E-mail: ali.akkemik@khas.edu.tr
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Erten (2009) and estimate the ratios of intermediate in-
put to gross output by each sector. e difference between 
gross output and value added yield total intermediate de-
mand. 
Foreign Trade: We reorganized export and import data 
which are published annually by Turkstat into 16 sectors. 
Trade data for services are taken from the balance of pay-
ments tables published by the Central Bank. To estimate 
natural gas imports, including LNG (liquefied natural gas) 
imports, volumes in 2010 are taken from the annual natu-
ral gas report published by EPDK (Turkish Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority). Since import prices vary with the 
countries of origin and are not officially announced we use 
price approximations in line with media reports for natural 
gas imported from Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. For LNG 
imports from Algeria and Nigeria we use average import 
prices paid by Germany which is available in a 2013 Statis-
tical Review of BP. Average price in the UK is used for spot 
LNG imports. Finally, we also correct for the discrepancies 
regarding trade flows with Turkey’s free trade zones which 
are not included in GDP series as in Erten (2009).
Labor Compensation: To estimate labor compensation, 
we obtain data by sectors from the Social Security Insti-
tution of Turkey (SGK) on the basis of NACE (Statistical 
classification of economic activities in the European Com-
munity) Rev. 2 classification. We calculate annual labor 
compensation. We adjust the number of workers and labor 
compensation in the private sector by inflating the number 
of workers and labor compensation using the adjustment 
factors in Erten (2009). To avoid inconsistency with offi-
cial statistics, we apply 2006 shares to calculate cost com-
ponents of Turkey’s GDP in 2010, because they were the 
most recent ones available.
Operating Surplus: We separate public sector operating 
surplus from that of the private sector. Total operating sur-
plus for state-owned companies is calculated as the sum of 
“factor income” from public sector general budget account 
as well as interest rate payments for social security insti-
tutions and State-owned Enterpises (SOEs) as in Erten 
(2009). Gross operating surplus is calculated as a residual.
Final Demand: Final demand block is composed of 
household consumption, government expenditures, pri-
vate firms’ investments, and public firms’ investments. 
Aggregate figures for these accounts are taken from GDP 
series. Specifically, household consumption is calculated 
using the statistics in Household Budget Survey and sec-
toral household consumption shares computed from IOT 
and IEA (International Energy Agency) statistics for en-
ergy accounts. e relevant figures for electricity and gas-
oil sectors are estimated using EDAS and IEA statistics. 
Sectoral distribution of public sector fixed investments is 
based on data published by the Ministry of Development. 
Energy investments are disaggregated using data obtained 
from TEIAS.
Institutions: e remaining parts of activity and com-
modity accounts in the SAM are calculated as residual so 
as to ensure column sum and row sum balance. 
2.2. Disaggregation of the Electricity Sector
In this section, we introduce the dynamics of interme-
diate demand interactions among different categories of 
power sector participants. is is followed by separation 
of generation into private and public sector and the in-
troduction of four satellite accounts for the electricity 
industry. Intermediate power use by electricity sectors is 
strongly related to the market structure. e interaction 
among participants is complex. For instance, state-owned 
generator (EUAS) can sell power to the state-run wholesale 
company (TETAS) and distribution companies (EDAS) 
under universal service obligations or at the balancing and 
settlement market (PMUM). Also, TETAS can buy and 
sell from EUAS; PMUM buys all output of BO, BOT, and 
TOOR plants, and sells to distribution companies and el-
igible consumers. We simplify these transactions in Figure 
1.
Figure 1. A simplified version of the structure of the 
Turkish electricity market. Note: GenPu – public sector 
power generation; GenPriv – private sector power generation; 
TETAS – state-run wholesale company TETAS; PMUM 
– balancing and settlement market; Wholsl – private sector 
wholesale trading companies; Dis.co – distribution compa-
nies; Tet.elg. – TETAS eligible consumers; Eligible cons. – El-
igible consumers.
e key characteristic of our SAM is the sectoral disag-
gregation which emphasizes the electricity sector. Electric-
ity-related data are not available in the official IOT. We 
used data from IEA, grid operator (TEIAS), energy mar-
PMU
M 
Whol
sl 
GenPu 
GenPri
v 
Elg.co
n
Dis.c
o 
Tetas Tet.elg	
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ket regulator (EPDK), state-run utility (EUAS), state-run 
wholesale company (TETAS), state-run retail company 
(TEDAS), state-owned natural gas company (BOTAS), 
and private power companies. We obtained detailed sup-
ply-side data from the grid operator to compute I-O coef-
ficients for electricity sectors. Data availability was a major 
constraint as generation data are available by TEIAS but 
demand-side data were largely unavailable. Supply-side 
and demand-side data for the remaining energy sectors, 
i.e., gas-oil and coal, are estimated using IEA statistics and 
data published by regulator.
We first split the electricity account into public and pri-
vate generation sectors. en, we introduce four satellite 
accounts: (i) state-run wholesale trading (TETAS), (ii) 
private sector wholesale trading, (iii) distribution compa-
nies (EDAS), and (iv) organized power market (day-ahead 
market and the balancing and settlement market PMUM). 
Public sector generation includes power generated by 
EUAS and its affiliates as well as BOO, BOT, and TOOR 
plants. Private sector generation sector includes independ-
ent private generators and autoproducers. We include 
these plants in the public sector because their output is 
subject to price guarantees by the state for a certain pe-
riod of time, usually 15-20 years. erefore, they are not 
exposed to market risks in competitive markets. Most of 
the state-run utilities’ sales are also guaranteed via bilateral 
agreements with TETAS and distribution companies. We 
treat PMUM as a sector because it gathers buyers and sell-
ers in an anonymous power trading setting. 
Most average prices at which power is purchased and sold 
in various segments by market participants are available 
from the relevant institutions. However, unregulated pric-
es which are determined through bilateral negotiations be-
tween counterparties are missing. We make some assump-
tions about unregulated power prices: 
1. e price at which private sector producers sell to 
eligible consumers is 2.5% lower than the regulated 
price imposed on distribution companies.
2. e price at which wholesale companies sell to eli-
gible consumers is the same as the price they charge 
to PMUM. 
3. e prices IPPs and private wholesale companies sell 
to distribution companies are the same as respective 
average prices the former two sold to PMUM.
4. e price autoproducers bought power from IPPs 
and TETAS is the same as the price they bought 
from PMUM.
5. e price IPPs bought electricity from IPPs is the 
same as the price they paid to PMUM.
6. e price wholesale companies sold power to IPPs is 
the same price as the price sold to PMUM.
7. e price private wholesale companies sold to other 
wholesale companies is the same as prices these firms 
sold to PMUM. 
8. e price private wholesale companies bought power 
from IPPs and autoproducers is equal to the weight-
ed average price IPPs and autoproducers bought 
from PMUM.
9. e average export price of private wholesale com-
panies is calculated as follows: we take the difference 
between total power exports from Turkstat and TE-
TAS in and then divide it by physical volumes in 
MW exported by wholesale companies.
10. e import price of private wholesale companies is 
the same as the import price of TETAS. 
e cost of fuel used in generation is the most important 
intermediate input expenditure for electricity sectors. We 
calculate the generation mix of state-run and private util-
ities using TEIAS and TETAS data. We need to compute 
costs of generation in monetary terms. While no such data 
are available for state-run utilities, private sector genera-
tion costs by resources are available for 2013 in Aksa Enerji 
(2014). Once the costs of fuel are calculated for private 
generators, we subtract these from overall generation costs 
by each fuel type to compute fuel costs for public gener-
ators. We then calculate the shares of private and public 
sector generation sectors’ spending on fuels in total fuel 
cost by generators. 
I-O data for satellite accounts, are presented in Table 2. 
Payments to services by TETAS, PMUM, and EDAS are 
estimated using data from reports published by TETAS, 
TEIAS, and TEDAS while payments to goods and services 
by satellite accounts to other sectors is assumed to be zero. 
Electricity - Demand Side: Detailed information about the 
volume of power consumption by sectors is available in 
IEA (2012). Residential consumption of power was en-
tirely from distribution companies. Before power sector 
reform was introduced in 2001, only distribution com-
panies were eligible to deliver electricity to industrial and 
residential end-users. Information about which industries 
purchase power from which group of power market par-
ticipants is not available. erefore, we assume that these 
participants distribute power to all sectors in the same pro-
portions as their shares in IEA data. An exception is TE-
TAS sales to eligible consumers, which are available from 
the company’s reported sales.
Oil, Natural Gas, and Coal - Demand Side: For sectoral 
disaggregation of oil, natural gas, and coal at NACE Rev. 
3 level of sectoral classification, we use physical quantities 
reported by IEA. Oil and oil product prices are not regulat-
ed so there is no single price for these commodities. We use 
oil indicative average respective producer prices in EPDK 
(2011: 90). Residential oil consumption is calculated us-
ing physical volumes from IEA data. Regulated natural gas 
prices are taken from official statistics to estimate gas con-
sumption in monetary terms. We assume that industrial 
users, including in the electricity sector, purchase gas at 
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Table 1. Macro-SAM for 2010 (unit: billion Turkish liras)
Table 2. Simplified Turkish power market structure in 2010 [unit: million TL] (Source: TEIAS/PMUM 
TEIAS/MYTM EUAS EDAS TETAS EPDK, author’s calculations.)
the wholesale price of organized industrial zones. e gas 
price for residential consumers is taken from the subscrib-
ers category of regulated prices charged by distribution 
companies. To estimate the purchase price of household 
consumption of gas, we assume that 76.2% of total natu-
ral gas bill is the cost of gas and the remaining part is the 
distribution fee and indirect taxes. 
2.3. Balancing the SAM
e constructed SAM ends up unbalanced owing to us-
age of data from different sources. However, row sums in 
a SAM must equal the columns sum for the respective ac-
counts. We employ the RAS (Reliability, Availability and 
Serviceability) method as in United Nations (1999). e 
RAS method is an iterative method of bi-proportional ad-
justment of rows and columns and it is widely used to up-
date and revise IOT when new information are available. 
3. Conclusion
e aim of this paper was to construct a SAM for Tur-
key with a special focus on electricity market using data 
for the year 2010. e unavailability of electricity market 
aggregates in the IOT should be addressed. Significant dis-
crepancies were observed in the data but we did our best to 
reconcile these data.
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7	
GenPu GenPri TETAS PMUM Wholesale EDAS Exports Eligible consumers 
GenPu 9.8 3639.3 1214.1 122.4 1344.2 
GenPri 22.1 645.8 11075.0 122.0 572.5 
TETAS 479.0 1390.0 152.8 748.1 3766.7 
PMUM 2.9 229.9 49.2 2.0 158.9 1638.4 
Wholesale 770.2 28.6 
EDAS 54.0 26.9 
Imports 479.0 1424.8 11095.1 6688.6 2038.3 23550.2 3583.7 
7	
1 2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 6 TOTAL 
1 Activities 1171.0 231.4 1402.4 
2 Commodities 532.5 742.6 75.7 163.1 48.9 1562.8 
3.1 Labor 355.3 355.3 
3.2 Public capital 434.6 434.6 
3.3 Private capital 39.5 39.5 
4.1 Household 337.4 490.7 93.5 1.5 923.1 
4.2 Enterprise 434.6 39.5 48.0 1.6 523.7 
4.3 Government 40.5 90.7 17.9 69.3 20.9 0.9 240.1 
5.1 Public investment 163.1 163.1 
5.2 Private investment -51.8 17.0 83.8 48.9 
6 Rest of the world 301.2 12.0 6.0 319.2 
TOTAL 1402.4 1562.8 355.3 434.6 39.5 923.1 523.7 240.1 163.1 48.9 319.2 
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Should Turkey Change the Regulatory Model for 
Electricity Distribution?
Fuat Oğuz* and Koray Göksal**
e regulatory model in Turkey is not well suited for the changing market environment and a new model has to be designed in order to 
create necessary incentives for companies to increase customer satisfaction rather than following government intervention beyond regulation. 
Our aim is to discuss the actual and potential problems of the existing tariff model and show the need for a major revision in the regulatory 
framework, if the liberalization of the industry is expected to continue as planned.
1. Introduction
e regulatory model of electricity distribution was es-
tablished in 2001 in Turkey. e lack of investments, 
vast inefficiencies in the industry and increasing demand 
contributed to the move toward liberalization (Cetin and 
Oguz, 2007). However, the model was not designed to 
push Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to follow the 
privatization agreements completely. e electricity indus-
try evolved toward a more competitive structure, and com-
panies began to see that electricity generation was not a 
risk-free market. e establishment of the energy exchange 
and the evolution of market transactions created problems 
for companies and put pressure on the downstream seg-
ments of the market.
During the design period of the tariff model, the infra-
structure was not expected to change quickly. e natural 
monopoly characteristics of the industry assumed to re-
main intact for the foreseeable future. us, observing in-
puts and guaranteeing distribution companies some profit 
margin through regulatory processes were thought to be 
the right way to go. Another problem of incentive regula-
tion model is the information asymmetry between the reg-
ulatory agency and the regulated firm. Since the regulatory 
agency depends on the firm for information, this creates 
tensions in the implementation process. Asymmetric in-
formation gives way to stricter regulations on DSO.  
While there is a growing literature on different aspects of 
the Turkish electricity markets, the regulatory model and 
its assessment are usually ignored. e dearth of works that 
focus on the economic consequences of the tariff model 
provided the motivation for this paper. We believe to con-
tribute to the literature by discussing the potential and ac-
tual problems with the existing model and address policy 
issues surrounding it.
2. Reasons for Reconsidering the Regulation of DSOs
e regulatory model of electricity distribution was de-
signed during a period where the technology was relatively 
stable. When Stephen Littlechild and M. Beesley (1980) 
first developed incentive regulation, it was thought to be a 
method to eliminate the problems of the rate of return reg-
ulation. During the last decade the technology advanced 
and the natural monopoly model started to create ineffi-
ciencies in the tariff model. 
In the traditional model, DSOs had the role of being 
‘transporters’ of electricity. us, they have to provide 
some kind of universal access to electricity. ey have to 
provide this service as efficiently as possible and transfer 
gains of efficiency to consumers. e regulatory model 
was designed under these conditions. However, the role of 
DSO changed substantially in the last decade. e follow-
ing are major changes: 
1. One fundamental change is in advances in distribut-
ed generation. e advances in wind and solar power 
and small scale hydro turbine change the structure 
of tariffs. Advances in small scale generation such as 
rooftop solar also changes the relationship between 
the DSO and consumer. 
2. Another important development is advances in the 
storage technology and electric vehicles. e dis-
tribution tariffs started at a time when distribution 
meant using a resource that was not storable, and the 
use was not a substitute for other energy resources 
such as oil. 
3. Technological advances have the tendency to de-
crease the DSO revenues (Pérez-Arriaga, 2010). e 
integration of distributed generation, energy conser-
vation measures and other factors reduce electricity 
demand during the implementation periods. 
4. e revenue-cap model does not encourage inno-
vation as expected. Empirical studies show that the 
ratchet effect  is more prominent in the industry. e 
model does not have any variable or component to 
reduce the ratchet effect.
In this changing environment, the role of DSOs also 
evolve. ey become more than just a network operator. 
*   A  Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Department of Economics
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Advances in financial and technological dimensions re-
quire changes in the tariff model as well. ey create value 
as well by being the key player in the value chain of elec-
tricity industry. 
3. The Outline of the Existing Tariff Model in Turkey
e Turkish regulatory model for electricity distribution 
follows European countries to some extent. In this model,
Allowed revenue = Authorized Opex + Depreciation + Op-
portunity Cost (WACC) + Tax Difference   
And, the CAPEX is determined in the following way:
Authorized Capex = Base expenditures + Physical Growth + 
Productivity Parameter (X)
e fundamentals of the model is the same in many 
countries. Yet, small differences occur. 
4. Shortcomings of the Existing Model
Now let us look at the problems of the existing model 
more closely.
1. A major issue with the existing tariff model is its as-
sumption of constant technology. Since the model 
was designed in a period where the technology of dis-
tribution did not change substantially, the evolution 
of technical and economic aspects of tariffs was not 
part of model. 
2. e existing tariff structure uses a revenue-cap mod-
el. It requires the national regulatory agency (En-
ergy Market Regulatory Agency, EMRA) to follow 
DSOs very strictly in order to minimize the potential 
rent-extracting in the sector. 
3. e way OPEX and CAPEX are defined, imple-
mented and estimated creates problems for EMRA. 
A major reason is the problems with data. Official 
numbers and predictions, in some cases, did not fit 
with the realities of the industry. e problem with 
the data is reflected in the tariff models as well. e 
productivity variables calculated in the model do not 
reflect the realities of the industry.
4. EMRA corrects errors in the initial tariff decisions 
during the implementation period. is is usually 
done by postponing the problem to the next tariff 
period, in order not play with the existing tariffs a 
lot. Yet, this behavioral pattern creates wrong incen-
tives in the industry and encourages firms not to take 
action to improve themselves. 
5. A major issue in this context is about the produc-
tivity variable in the tariff model. e existing tariff 
structure is supposed to push companies to improve 
their productivity during the implementation peri-
od. ey are expected to keep the gains of productiv-
ity. However, more productive firms are expected to 
have less room for improvement in the next period. 
Because of the difficulty of monitoring the sector, 
some DSOs prefer not to increase productivity as 
planned in the initial tariff decisions. 
6. Most importantly, the methodology of EMRA on 
distribution tariffs is not clear. e reasoning and de-
tails of models are not made public. us, we try to 
understand it by guessing the logic of the regulator. 
Regulators began to see that it is not easy to follow in-
come tables and expenditures of DSOs, as theory expect-
ed. Being rational players, distribution companies used the 
system for profit-maximizing, which was not an assump-
tion of the initial model. e model assumed that compa-
nies would act according to the rules of the model. is 
was also not realistic.
Recently, the government increased pressure over the 
DSO to improve customer satisfaction, their infrastruc-
ture, reduce costs and increase their investment activities. 
Yet, the current regulatory model is not appropriate for 
achieving these goals. It is time to look at alternative mod-
els rather than focusing on monitoring inputs in the reve-
nue requirement tables of DSOs. 
Conclusion
e incentive regulation model is used widely around the 
world. Its problems are also well documented. e prob-
lems with the price cap and revenue cap models in the 
distribution market led to a move toward a more output 
oriented tariff model. e problems of estimating, bench-
marking and even defining CAPEX and OPEX push reg-
ulators toward observing output variables so that the need 
for investigating the expenditures of DSO is reduced. As a 
result, the output based, or result-based, regulatory models 
have become the subject of research.  
A new model in this direction is introduced by the Unit-
ed Kingdom. e model is known as ‘the RIIO model’ 
(Revenue = Incentives+ Innovation + Outputs). In this 
model, the outputs such as consumer satisfaction, reliabil-
ity and availability, safety, connectivity, environmental im-
pact and social responsibilities are being considered. Each 
DSO submits an 8-year plan that specifies total expendi-
tures rather than CAPEX and OPEX separately. e aim 
is to balance conflicting incentives for reducing costs and 
increasing investments. While this approach is new and its 
success is not certain, the need to modify the revenue cap 
model is clear. Turkey, in the face of the problems of the 
existing tariff model, should revise it and do it in a way to 
encourage productivity rather than manipulating the tariff 
model. 
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Cheapest Cost Avoider Approach to the Electricity Loss 
and Theft in Turkey 
Erman Benli*, Hande Emin Benli**
Cheapest cost avoider principle (CCAP) is applicable not only to accidents or damages but also to cases for all potential Cheapest Cost 
Avoiders (CCAs) including multiple parties such as third parties and government. In this context, we tried to implement the CCAP to the 
electricity loss and theft problem in Turkey. In the particular case, electricity loss and theft should not be considered within the limits of 
contracting parties. It is a social cost problem. However, higher transaction costs in real life prevent contracting parties from internalizing the 
harmful effects of the problem and regulation is needed for solution. In practice, Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation decided in 
2014 that electricity companies have to bear the aforementioned costs. is decision increased the costs of electricity companies so that they 
started to lobby for passing a new regulation contrary to the court decision. e Turkish Parliament passed a new legal provision (Article 
17/6-ç) in 2016 including liability of consumers for the relevant costs. Both court decision and legal provision are inefficient and wealth de-
stroying because they disregard the reciprocal nature of the harm. Optimal regulation should allocate the loss and theft costs to the potential 
CCAs. It should also be redesigned to foster electricity companies to take efficient due care in the extent of current technology and technical 
capability. In other words, it is not economically efficient to make only consumers or companies liable.
Keywords: CCAP, electricity loss and theft, public interest, public choice, Turkey 
JEL: K23, K32, L50.
1. Introduction
Electricity is not just an economic but also a political good 
in developing countries and Turkey (Oguz et al. 2014: 
382). erefore, legislative and judicial process in the elec-
tricity loss and theft issue turns into a strategic game be-
tween politicians, bureaucrats and judges in Turkey (Cetin 
and Oguz 2007: 1763). Electricity loss and theft is a social 
cost problem. It creates harmful effects. It is not efficient to 
make one party liable for the aforementioned costs because 
of the reciprocal nature of the harm (Coase 1960: 2). e 
ruling case of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of 
Cassation and the Article 17/6-ç of the Electricity Market 
Law No. 6446 are inefficient because they make one party 
liable for the costs.
CCAP was derived from the Coase eorem. According 
to the CCAP, liability should be imposed on the party who 
solves the problem with a minimum cost (Calabresi and 
Hirschoff 1972, p. 1060). For the particular case in this 
paper, we try to apply CCAP to the electricity loss and 
theft issue which should be described as a social cost prob-
lem. Loss and theft costs should be allocated to the parties 
who solves the problem with a minimum cost. erefore, 
electricity distribution companies should be liable for the 
costs to the optimum level. How do we determine the op-
timum level? It means technological limitations (highest 
level of technology) and technical capabilities. Consum-
ers should also be liable for the rest of the costs exceeding 
optimum level. CCAP solution to the social cost problem 
minimizes the negative externality of court decision and 
the legal provision. 
e remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. 
In the next section, we briefly explain the legal history of 
the issue. Section three provides CCAP analysis of the legal 
provision and court decisions for the efficient distribution 
of liability. Section four presents overall conclusions.
2. A Brief Legal History of the Issue
e Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) de-
cided in 2010 that consumers should be liable for loss and 
theft costs. Consumers applied to the Consumer Arbitra-
tion Committees (CAC) so as to annul the EMRA’s de-
cision. e CAC decided in favor of consumers in 2011. 
Electricity distribution companies appealled the decision 
of CAC and the 3rd Civil Chamber of the Court of Cas-
sation took decisions  in favor of companies. After a year 
the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation decid-
ed  against the 3rd Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassa-
tion. EMRA disagreed with the decision of the Joint Civil 
Chambers. In order to eliminate the ruling case of Joint 
Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, Turkish Par-
liament passed a new legal provision (Article 17/6-ç)  in 
2016. It was designed to make consumers liable for loss 
and theft costs. 
After the effective date of the Article 17/6-ç, EMRA pre-
pared by-laws  concerning measures to reduce electricity 
loss. e Board of EMRA then took decisions  about tar-
get loss rate in 2015 and 2016. An opposition party in 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) brought 
*  Corresponding author. Social Sciences University of Ankara, Faculty of Law. E-mail: erman.benli@asbu.edu.tr 
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an action for annulment of temporary Article 18 of the 
Electricity Market Law No. 6446. is Article delegates 
power to EMRA in order to reduce loss and theft. Plaintiff 
alleged that delegating power to the EMRA is not concrete 
and this rule was designed to protect producers contrary to 
public interest and Turkish Constitution. Constitutional 
Court of Turkey denied the claims that reducing loss and 
theft costs is an expert issue so that delegating power to the 
EMRA is consistent with public interest . Constitutional 
Court of Turkey also added that even if temporary Arti-
cle 18 delegates discretion to EMRA, it must use its dis-
cretionary power according to Article 125 of the Turkish 
Constitution. In this context, temporary Article 18 does 
not impose additional financial liability for consumers ac-
cording to Constitutional Court of Turkey.
e legal history of the particular issue shows us that pol-
iticians, bureaucrats and judges read the notion of pub-
lic interest differently. ey all use public interest as an 
elusive, abstract and fictional concept to hide the wealth 
transfers through interest group politics.
3. CCAP is an Efficient Measure for Public Interest
3.1. Theoretical Background
From the law and economics perspective, public interest 
should be measurable. In legal debates over the benefits 
of rule making or court decisions, the meaning of public 
interest is usually assumed, rather than explicitly stated. 
Judges usually abstain from providing a clear definition of 
public interest. In academic circles, most scholars tend to 
start from market failure and establish a bridge to public 
interest (Ogus 1994; Weigel 2008, p. 17)
e link between economic inefficiency and its polit-
ical-legal remedy gets overlooked in the process. While 
public interest is connected to imperfect markets, the con-
cept of market failure does not necessarily indicate acting 
in the name of public interest. In the economic theory of 
regulation, public interest is broadly related to the protec-
tion of the public welfare. In this process, the theoretical 
connection between maximizing social welfare and its be-
ing in the public interest is taken for granted. However, the 
notion of public interest as maximizing social welfare does 
not find many allies among judges.
In addition to “economic” motives, some non-econom-
ic ones also drive the legal behavior. Distributional justice 
and paternalism play some role in rulemaking, regulation 
and court decisions. ese considerations usually assume 
that there is no public choice and knowledge issues rel-
evant to legislation and legal decisions. e analysis gets 
more complicated with the addition of government fail-
ure and epistemic ignorance in the legal decision and rule 
making. 
In most cases, it is possible to remedy market failures on 
the basis of private law (Ogus 1994; Shleifer 2005, p. 444). 
For example, internalization of externalities or compensat-
ing breaches of contract can be dealt with using the tools 
of the market system and do not necessarily require gov-
ernment intervention. When private law cannot solve the 
tension between private and public interests, public inter-
vention to increase social welfare becomes the “preferable” 
remedy. e implicit connection between market failure 
and public remedy assumes that there is no feasible private 
law alternative. It is usually assumed that even if there were 
private law alternatives, they would fail to address the ex-
isting market failure.
e market failure argument goes hand in hand with ‘pri-
vate law failure’. In order to have government intervention 
to market activities, not only economic behaviors but also 
the remedies of the private law should be deficient. While 
the theory takes the balanced view that a comparison of 
market failure plus private law failure with government 
failure, courts usually focus on private law failures and ne-
glect the government failure. It is implicitly assumed that 
the cost of public law involvement is lower than any other 
options including resolving the market failure by using pri-
vate law remedies.
During the 1970s, public interest became the reason for 
regulation. e public interest theory of economic regula-
tion rose to ascendancy and then was criticized extensively 
by the Chicago school economists (Hertog 1999). Howev-
er, the literature remained silent on the theoretical connec-
tion between public interest and market failure. 
e market failure approach takes a narrow conception of 
public interest. e goal of collective action, in this view, 
is the efficient use of resources.  However, political litera-
ture uses public interest in a wider sense. Social justice, pa-
ternalism, redistribution and participation in the political 
process become reasons for regulation (Sunstein 1990). In 
this view, the scope of public action expands and becomes 
ambiguous. 
e use of cost-benefit analysis on regulatory decisions 
opened the door to more comparative and quantifiable le-
gal and political decision-making in many countries. us 
the public interest approach has also begun to use the tools 
of cost-benefit analysis. Developments in regulatory im-
pact assessment methods provide more concrete analyses 
of public interest decisions and regulations. In this way, it 
becomes possible to have a more clear definition of public 
interest.
e reluctance to define public interest explicitly leaves 
plenty of room for political and legal maneuvering (Fein-
tuck 2004). is is one of the reasons why we do not find 
any clear description of what is public interest in court 
decisions. e decisions discussed below also follow this 
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trend. Judges cite the elusive concept of public interest 
without giving a clear definition of what is in the public’s 
interest, or how they make decisions following the criteri-
on of public interest.
A major component of the public interest concept de-
pends on the explanation about decisions that reduce 
social welfare. e public interest theory assumes that 
institutions are created for public purposes, but then mis-
managed or get out of hand (Posner 1974, p. 337). is 
view accepts that there is no fundamental flaw with the 
theory, yet the implementation of public interest through 
bureaucracy is flawed. us, the concept of human error is 
used as a theoretical explanation. e theory is based on a 
lofty but naïve ideal of law-based administration.
In this view, the lack of expertise, human errors and en-
forcement problems create poor policy. ese explanations 
easily turn into an excuse for budget expansions and in-
creases in pecuniary gains (Mueller 2003).
is view does not stand well against empirical evidence. 
e literature on regulatory issues shows that public deci-
sions of bureaucrats support specific groups consistently, 
and create systematic wealth transfers.  So there must be 
some conceptual misrepresentations of the public interest 
notion. While our goal is not to delve into these issues, 
there are two categorically different problems with the mis-
representation: knowledge problems and private interests. 
Friedrich Hayek elaborates on the knowledge problem 
(Hayek 1973). Neither regulators nor courts have all the 
necessary information to make decisions that maximize 
public interest in any empirically feasible way. Courts use 
crude proxies and rules of thumb to find public interest. 
e absence of any control mechanism for the interpreta-
tion of public interest and the vagueness of the definition 
leave room for less diligence and irresponsibility. In this 
vein Offe (1984) emphasizes the incompatibility between 
the generality of public control and the necessity of private 
solutions.
e second problem has given way to the public choice 
approach and the theory of interest group politics (Mueller 
2003). is theory starts from transactions between poli-
ticians who supply policy promises and voters who seek 
particular policies. While the rational goals of politicians, 
namely election and re-election, are well accepted, the 
reasons for voting are still controversial.  In the literature, 
both altruism and self-interest carry some weight. Candi-
dates should offer something to the electorate in exchange 
for votes. e range of voter demands forces politicians 
to offer “packages” rather than specific promises to voters.
Political parties reduce information costs of promise 
packages. ere is an entrepreneurial aspect to politicians. 
ey search for best packages of legislative benefits to per-
suade likely voters. e lack of continuous interaction be-
tween politicians and voters allows politicians to shirk in 
their promise packages more easily, as they are modeled 
within the principal-agent framework. 
An important participant in the political market is the 
bureaucracy. For public choice theory, bureaucrats are also 
self-interested. ey tend to be policy advocates rather 
than simply implementers (Mises 1996). Bureaucrats have 
some control over the flow of information between politi-
cians and voters and use their control to influence political 
decisions. In the public choice models, bureaucracy max-
imizes a number of separate variables, including income, 
reputation, power, and other non-pecuniary benefits. is 
description highlights differences between private manag-
ers, politicians and bureaucrats. e absence of any clear 
cost and benefit calculation allows bureaucrats to increase 
output and overlook costs. Bureaucracy creates another 
channel for wealth transfers between interest groups and 
politicians (Maggetti 2007, p. 273). In this process, public 
interest may be used to conceal distributional interven-
tions.
e same argument is sometimes put forward for judicia-
ry as well. In this view, judges behave rationally like every-
one else. According to Richard Posner, public interest does 
not take a pivotal place in judicial utility (Posner, 1993). 
After all, they have limited time and more cases than they 
can handle. Especially, in countries such as Turkey, where 
the caseload is too much to bear, subjective preferences be-
come more predominant. 
e concept of public interest has long been a rhetorical 
tool to sustain judiciary decisions. In the United States, 
the Supreme Court used it extensively (Peritz 1996). Sim-
ilarly, the Constitutional Court of Turkey had recourse to 
it largely on economic matters, as discussed below. In this 
process, public interest becomes a controversial concept. 
For politicians and the judiciary, the goal of the state is to 
pursue public interest. For critics, it is a fictional concept 
to hide the wealth transfers through interest group politics.
Public interest is understood quite differently in the eco-
nomics literature and legal writings. Economics literature 
refers to a dynamic process where the society moves from 
a lower level of welfare to a higher one.  e legal interpre-
tation uses it in a static manner by focusing on providing 
basic services. is also reflects the tension between these 
two realms.
3.2. Implementation for Turkey
CCAP was developed by Calabresi in his study of “e 
Cost of Accidents” based upon Coase (1960) and Demsetz 
(1967). e aim of this principle is to provide effective and 
optimal point of deterrence or due care. CCAP was devel-
oped to determine optimal liability rules in the field of tort 
law (Dari-Mattiacci and Garoupa 2007, p.4). However, it 
can also be applicable “to externality problems involving 
large numbers of parties.” (Schmidtchen et.al. 2015, p. 3). 
Electricity loss and theft issue is one of them in addition to 
environmental cases. Although CCAP has some deficien-
cies (Sinai and Shmueli 2014, p. 67), it works well in the 
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particular Turkish case.
We apply the CCAP to the particular issue more broadly 
than bilateral damages. us, CCAP can be used for all 
potential CCA actors including multiple parties such as 
third parties and government (Schmidtchen et.al. 2015, p. 
11). For instance, electricity consumers and government 
are third parties in the electricity loss and theft case. In this 
paper, both electricity distribution companies and con-
sumers are CCAP but the extent is different. 
Electricity loss and theft externality should be regulated 
because of high transaction costs. e legal rule should be 
designed to decrease transaction costs and allocate rights 
efficiently. So how do we allocate liability in an efficient 
way in the loss and theft case? Technology and technical 
capability of companies determine the allocation of costs. 
Companies should take efficient due care in order  to 
maximize it. e other part of the cost that companies are 
not technically capable to take efficient due care should 
be charged to consumers as potential CCA. us, Article 
17/6-ç should be redesigned to foster companies to take 
efficient due care in the extent of current technology and 
technical capability. e limit of efficient due care deter-
mines the ultimate allocation of rights or obligations. e 
percentage of loss and theft costs charged to consumers 
will be reduced in parallel with advanced technology and 
lower transaction costs in the course of time.  
4. Conclusion 
Electricity loss and theft should not be considered within 
the limits of contracting parties. It should be recognized 
as a social cost problem. However, higher transaction cost 
prevents contracting parties from internalizing the harmful 
effects through bargaining. Regulation is needed to solve 
the social cost problem. In practice, Joint Civil Chambers 
of the Court of Cassation decided in 2014 that electrici-
ty companies have to bear the aforementioned costs. is 
decision increased the costs of companies so that they 
started to lobby for passing a new regulation contrary to 
the court decision. Turkish Parliament has passed a new 
legal provision (Article 17/6-ç) in 2016 including liabili-
ty of consumers for the all costs. Both court decision and 
legal provision are inefficient and destroy wealth because 
they disregard the reciprocal nature of the harm. Regula-
tion should allocate the loss and theft costs to the potential 
CCAs. It should also be redesigned to foster companies to 
take efficient due care in the extent of current technology 
and technical capability. In other words, it is not economi-
cally efficient to make liable only consumers or companies.
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Competition and Regulation in Network Industries: a new Journal by  Sage
Commencing in 2017 SAGE is delighted to be the new publisher of Competition and Regulation in Network 
Industries.
We are building on the 16-year tradition and strength of the existing Intersentia Journal Competition and Regulation 
in Network Industries, yet strive to evolve it into an even higher quality journal, addressing the increasingly urgent 
challenge of governing (including regulating) complex and dynamic socio-technical systems (e.g., energy, transport, 
water, communication, urban systems), especially in light of pervasive digitalization.
Network industries are caught between technological developments, evolving competition and regulation. At the same 
time significant innovations – especially in the field of ICTs – offer new opportunities for infrastructure operations 
and governance. Exploring this combined technological and institutional dynamics between competition and 
regulation provides a fascinating field of research that challenges academics, managers and policy-makers alike.
e new Journal Competition and Regulation in Network Industries is resolutely interdisciplinary in nature, favoring 
articles that combine economic, legal, policy and engineering approaches and seek to link theory with practical 
relevance. It is a double- blind peer-reviewed journal that offers leading specialists opportunities to provide an in-
depth and forward-looking view on the evolving network industries.
Publication process:
e Journal welcomes submissions and engages in a collaborative discussion with the authors so as to produce the 
highest possible quality articles. Each article is double-blind peer reviewed. After acceptance, articles are published 
online on a rolling basis. 4 paper issues are published each year, containing each 4 to 6 articles.
e Journal holds an annual conference at the European University Institute in June each year. Papers presented 
there are offered a fast-track review process.
Editor in chief:
Prof Matthias Finger, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and European University Institute
Submit Now!
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Research for the TRAN Committee - 
Infrastructure funding challenges in the 
sharing economy
© European Union, 2017
Finger, Bert, Kupfer, Montero, Wolek, 2017, Research for TRAN 
Committee – Infrastructure funding challenges in the sharing 
economy, European Parliament, Policy Department for Structural 
and Cohesion Policies, Brussels
89 pages
About the Study
The study analyses the disruption created by shared mobility in the funding of transport infrastructure. 
While recognizing the beneﬁts of shared mobility in terms of reduction of private car use, the study 
identiﬁes that there might be short term negative effects on the revenues of long distance railway and 
coach operators. It also points out other potential risks, which include capturing the revenues through 
commissions charged by platforms mediating mass-transit services (Mobility as a Service), freeriding and 
lower tax contributions. The study makes recommendations to reduce these risks. 
Table of contents 
1. INTRODUCTION, 1.1 Purpose, 1.2 Methodology, 1.3 Structure of the study, 
2. SHARING ECONOMY AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE, 2.1 The concept of “sharing economy”, 
2.2 Forms of shared mobility, 2.3 The rising numbers of shared mobility, 2.4 Infrastructure and the new 
data layer, 2.5 Challenges of transport infrastructure ﬁnancing, 
3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHARING ECONOMY ON LONG DISTANCE TRANSPORTATION, 3.1 
Introduction, 3.2 Description of carpooling, 3.3 Substitution of other transport modes, 3.4 Legal restrictions 
to carpooling, 
4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHARING ECONOMY ON URBAN TRANSPORTATION, 4.1 Introduction, 4.2 
Description of shared urban mobility, 4.3 Substitution of other transport modes, 4.4 Mobility as a Service, 
5. CHALLENGES FOR CURRENT MECHANISMS OF INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING, 5.1 Introduction, 
5.2 Challenges created by the substitution effect, 5.3 Value appropriation by online platforms, 5.4 Value 
erosion by new services, 5.5 Data management, 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS, 6.1 Improvement of information, 6.2 Integration of shared mobility in the 
regulatory ecosystem as new transport modes, 6.3 Provision of incentives to shared mobility as a 
substitute to private vehicle, 6.4 Creation of a level playing ﬁeld when shared mobility competes with 
mass-transit services, 6.5 Adaptation of PSO policies, 6.6 Ensuring the sustainability of investment in 
physical infrastructure, 6.7 Big data sharing. 
About the Series
The Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union is responsible for organising the work of 
European Parliament's committees in the ﬁeld of internal policies and contributing to the exercise and 
development of the legislative and control powers of the European Parliament. Among its main tasks, DG 
IPOL is providing the committees, other parliamentary bodies and the President's Ofﬁce with brieﬁngs, 
background notes and long-term studies on all aspects of Parliament's activities in the ﬁeld of internal 
policies. Directorate B is the responsible one for Structural and Cohesion Policies.
Download the study
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 19, issue 3, 2017 (September) 
“Regulatory challenges for smart cities.” 
Presentation of the next issue
e de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an ongoing process at national and global level. As this 
process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge, which call for a constant reassessment of the content and objectives of 
regulation.
e question becomes even more challenging when looking at recent infrastructure development at the local level. 
Phenomena including (but not limited to) demographic changes, the rapidly evolving consequences of climate change 
and the evolution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have significantly challenged the traditionally 
stable landscape of urban infrastructure services provision. Providing traditional and new services in an innovative way is 
a growing trend among public authorities, traditional providers as well as new private prosumers and platforms for sharing 
economy. Both small and large agglomerations are seeking to become the so-called “smart cities”. However, together 
with great opportunities, disruptive innovations also give rise to new regulatory challenges, especially on infrastructure 
financing and management of future “smart cities”.
e next issue of the Network Industries Quarterly (NIQ) will be dedicated to some of the best papers presented at 
the 6th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures, which is organized by the Florence School of Regulation in 
June 2017. Selected academics and practitioners have been invited to Florence to discuss the latest developments in 
the regulation of different network industries, namely transport, energy, telecoms and water distribution. Both the 
Conference and the next issue of the NIQ have a special focus on smart cities, and they build on the long-lasting 
experience of all the Area directors of the Florence School of Regulation. 
More information
If you are interested in learning more about the “6th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures: e challenges 
of digitalization and the use of data” and the next issue of the Network Industries Quarterly, please send an email to Ms. 
Nadia Bert at fsr.transport@eui.eu. 
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Implementation of the liberalization process has brought various 
challenges to incumbent fi rms operating in sectors such as air transport, 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, water and railways, as well as to 
new entrants, to regulators and to the public authorities.
Th erefore, the Network Industries Quarterly is aimed at covering research 
fi ndings regarding these challenges, to monitor the emerging trends, as well 
as to analyze the strategic implications of these changes in terms of regulation, 
risks management, governance and innovation in all, but also across, the 
diﬀ erent regulated sectors. 
Th e Network Industries Quarterly, published by the Chair MIR (Management 
of Network Industry, EPFL) in collaboration with the Transport Area of the 
Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute), is an open 
access journal funded in 1998 and, since then, directed by Prof Matthias Finger.
Open Call For Papers
Th e Network Industries Quarterly is a multidisciplinary international 
publication. Each issue is coordinated by a guest editor, who chooses four 
to six diﬀ erent articles all related to the topic chosen. Articles must be high-
quality, written in clear, plain language. Th ey should be original papers 
that will contribute to furthering the knowledge base of network industries 
policy matters. Articles can refer to theories and, when appropriate, deduce 
practical applications. Additionally, they can make policy recommendations 
and deduce management implications. 
Detailed guidelines on how to submit the articles and coordinate the issue 
will be provided to the selected guest editor. 
Article Preparation
Published four times a year, the Network Industries Quarterly contains short analytical 
articles about postal, telecommunications, energy, water, transportation and network 
industries in general. It provides original analysis, information and opinions on current 
issues. Articles address a broad readership made of university researchers, policy 
makers, infrastructure operators and businessmen. Opinions are the sole responsibility 
of the author(s). Contact fsr.transport@eui.eu to subscribe. Subscription is free. 
Additional Information
More Information
• network-industries.org
• mir.ep .ch
•  orence-school.eu
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